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vealed in the mystical experience itself, and says that the objective factor is added when the experience is interpreted. The cause of the interpretation made does not reside in the nature of the experience itself; but "tradition and instruction, auto-suggestion grown habitual, and reflective analysis,"²⁰ determine the interpretation of the mystical experience as a revelation of God. "The mystic brings his theological beliefs to the mystical experience; he does not derive them from it."²¹

Though the half-way mysticism of most mystics is inadequate, and involves the fallacy of false attribution, it is still possible that there may be a mystical solution of the religious problem. So long as any recognition is made of phenomenal reality and the world that the sciences study, mysticism must be regarded as emotionalism only, with a false belief as to the source of the emotion; but a complete metaphysical mysticism, such as Royce expounds and refutes, may still be the truest insight, and farthest from a final refutation. Thoroughgoing mysticism is at least wonderfully attractive, occasionally for all reflective persons, and always for a few; and it will continue to lure world-weary souls to the promised rest and peace of its Nirvana.

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DR. DEWEY'S DUALITY AND DUALISM

DR. DEWEY'S "Duality and Dualism"¹ furnishes another depressing bit of evidence that even the ablest philosophers sometimes can not grasp the simplest distinctions of those who hold views alien to their own. At the outset of the article whose logic Professor Dewey criticizes I had taken pains to explain the distinction between what many of us call epistemological dualism and what we call ontological dualism. I had tried in earlier articles (to one of which he also refers) to make clear that my view, although epistemologically dualistic, was ontologically monistic. My distinction had been ignored by several critics, who attacked my doctrine as an ontological dualism. In this article, therefore, I wrote: "I wish to leave no excuse for any further confusion of my epistemological dualism with ontological dualism." "In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I wish to state as explicitly as possible that I personally side with the dominant tendency in American realism in denying the existence

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. XIV., p. 491.

of a non-physical stuff or realm or awareness or subject or ego—"there ain't no sech animal." The 'mental' is a subclass of the physical, or refers, if you prefer, to a relation between certain physical entities. This is ontological monism."

This distinction, and this use of terms, is no idiosyncrasy of mine. All of these terms are, of course, open to objection and misunderstanding. But it has seemed to me wisest to keep to the terms used by those whom I know to hold the doctrine which I hold. I recently discussed this matter of terminology with four leaders of philosophic thought in this country, frequent contributors to these columns, who hold the doctrine. It was their unanimous feeling that these are the best terms to use for the doctrines to which I refer, and that the distinction which I have emphasized, and which Dr. Dewey persists in ignoring, is important. I must ask, then, in all courtesy, to have my terms accepted in this sense, in which they are currently used by responsible writers, and which I have been careful to explain.

We have often offered evidence that our sense-data constitute information (even when not recognized as such) concerning existents outside of consciousness. The perceiver gains his knowledge of these outer existents through his sense-data. They may be said to represent those outer existents, in the sense that they vary concomitantly with them, and act as substitutes for them in guiding the organism. If this is the situation, our term "epistemological dualism" seems to us warranted. Professor Dewey does not discuss the evidence we offer; and I must not here repeat it. Nor am I concerned to defend our terms as the best available. All that I wish to do is to clear them from an evident misinterpretation, and thereby to defend myself from the accusation of logical fallacy.

My logic, my critic says, "amounts to assuming that wherever you have numerical duality in perceiving there you have epistemological dualism." But we do not say "wherever," nor do we say that *any* "numerical duality" implies epistemological dualism. What we say is that *in certain situations* (perception, memory, etc.) there is numerical duality (*viz.*, between sense-datum, memory-datum, etc., on the one hand, and object-perceived, object-remembered, etc., on the other hand), *of a certain sort* (described above); and any theory which clearly recognizes this kind of duality in these situations we *call* epistemological dualism. That is what we who hold the doctrine *mean* by it.

Professor Dewey's misunderstanding seems to be twofold. In the first place, the "numerical duplicity" which he speaks of is apparently not that which we are speaking of, not that which leads us to call our doctrine by the name which he thinks unwarranted. The numerical duplicity which he recognizes is "the difference in

time and place, *etc.*, of the organic event of sensing, imagining, *etc.*, from that of its extra-organic cause . . . a difference in the detail of a series continuously physical in all its constituents." This duality he has often spoken of, apparently supposing that this is the duality which we epistemological dualists are talking about. We have replied, in effect, that we recognize that physical series, and rejoice in it, but that our doctrine rests upon another duality entirely, the duality, namely, which I have mentioned in the preceding paragraph. By "object perceived" we refer to what he is apparently referring to by the phrase "extra-organic cause." But by "sense-datum" we mean something else than "the organic event of sensing." Hence the statement that the two items of which he chooses to speak (together with various other items of which we are likewise not speaking) stand in a continuous physical series is an irrelevance.

Even, however, if he were speaking of the same two items as we, it would be still irrelevant to show that they stand in a continuous physical series. Suppose they do! We shall none the less call ourselves epistemological dualists. For the meaning of that term has nothing to do with the question whether or no our two items stand in such a series. It is just the simple *fact* of the duality plus the fact of the use by the organism of the one item as if it were the other, that leads us to adopt that term, in contradistinction to those who deny or ignore that duality.

But his chief misunderstanding is that of which I spoke at the outset, the assumption that I mean by the term "epistemological dualism" the belief in two kinds or realms of Being, that I believe in "a separate world called psychical." After admitting a duality (*his* duality, not mine) in perception, he says, "At no point is there a switch from one order or genus of Being to another. And without such a switch there is neither epistemological dualism nor does the demand for an epistemological monism arise." Here, as throughout, he seems to be reading into the term "epistemological dualism" what, in the very article he is criticizing, I explicitly declared to be not its meaning for me. His confusion results no doubt from the fact that many, perhaps most, epistemological dualists are also ontological dualists; and some of them on occasion have made the very illogical leap which he attributes to me. The distinction, however, between the two senses of the word "dualism" is clear enough; and the failure to recognize it leads him to misread my conclusion as well as my premise. It is small wonder that he finds my logic faulty!

The incident deserves this attention, not for the sake of protecting the honor of my logic, but in order to win a better comprehension for a doctrine held by not a few, and persistently misrepre-

sented by its opponents. The whole issue between us and the epistemological monists evidently seems factitious to Professor Dewey; he declares he has not a "chemical trace of interest" in the one doctrine, and no more in the other. If it is not discourteous, I should like to suggest the possibility that the pragmatist's lack of interest in certain problems with which other workers are grappling may occasionally be due, like the sense of superiority of the contemporary pacifist who is "above the battle," not to an actual transcendence of the problems, or discovery of their unreality, but to obsession by an inhibiting idea which prevents their acuteness from being felt.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Rhythm of Prose. WILLIAM MORRISON PATTERSON. New York: Columbia University Press. 1916. Pp. xvii + 193.

Common enough in our vast literature on the subject of *rhythm* are the empirical researches made by psychologists who are interested in this particular field. Seldom, however, have those who are chiefly associated with the musical and literary arts undertaken to contribute data patiently gleaned from scientific investigations of their own. With greater stress on the experimental side of art may come the development of a science of music, of literature, of painting, and of sculpture. And what science can be of greater service in laying the foundations of an adequate knowledge of the underlying principles which form the basis of music, of literature, or of any other art, than psychology? An eminent psychologist and philosopher recently remarked that at no far distant date we should be able to control the forces of mind as precisely as we now regulate the forces of matter. When the thoughts, emotions, and actions of men's minds can be harnessed as we now harness the energies of physical and chemical substances, two things may happen: we shall be enjoying our lives in a world of peace without pause or, becoming the tools and slaves of misleading leaders, we shall wage war more diabolically than ever.

Be that as it may, we are surely taking a great step in the direction of understanding the mental structure of man more accurately when we begin to study music and literature from a psychological point of view. New vistas begin to spread out before us, new products of mind are critically examined. Not long hence, as we now read about a psychology of music,¹ we shall notice the familiar

¹ Cf. H. P. Weld, "An Experimental Study of Musical Enjoyment," *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XXIII., pp. 245-308.